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This article theorizes that there is a determinate relationship between 
states of national elites and the stable or unstable conditions of national 
political institutions. Four basic states of national elites, their origins 
and their persistence, are treated as comprising a theoretical construct 
which can be used to explain observable continuities and changes in 
institutional conditions. Eighty-one countries constituted the universe 
in which the theory could have been expected to operate between 1950-1982, and 
each country is classified according to its observable institutional condition(s) 
and its apparent elite state(s). Countries which represent the limiting cases 
for each category are discussed in some detail. Only eight countries are found 
to have exhibited a change in institutional condition, and there is substantial 
evidence that, consistent with the theory, in each of them a particular kind of 
elite transformation preceded this institutional change. Overall, the persis­
tence of institutional conditions and elite states in 73 countries and the 
specific changes which occurred in the remaining eight appear to be at odds 
with explanations of institutional stability/instability which utilize more 
conventional non-elite or international variables. The theoretical and policy 
implications of this observation are discussed.
The States of National Elites and the Stability of





















































































































































































It has been widely noted that key aspects of scientific theories are 
subject only to indirect verification. They contain terms, which are usually 
designated as constructs, whose definition is neither complete nor empirically 
applicable in a direct way (Gibbs, 1972, p.125). Verification proceeds by 
checking for the logical consequences of the postulates, propositions and 
other statements which such constructs generate (Kemeny, 1959, p.96). Evidence 
to suggest the plausibility of constructs is marshalled, but it remains necessary 
to confirm some of their most important properties and effects through observa­
tions of the phenomena with which they are ostensibly associated (Przeworski and 
Teune, 1970, pp.100-104). A principal reason for the non-cumulative empiricism 
that is found in many areas of social science is the failure to develop and test 
theories in this way. Prevailingly, social scientists have been content to 
state empirical generalizations on the basis of statistically significant 
correlations between variables that are all more or less equally observable 
and directly measurable (Wilier and Webster, 1970).
The field of elite studies is a case in point. Although there has been 
an outpouring of research on elites in recent years (Putnam, 1976), where they 
have not been merely trivial the results of this research have been prosaically 
descriptive and theoretically non-cumulative (Zuckerman, 1977). The basic 
problem is that few’ of the behavioral dynamics of elites can be observed and 
measured directly or fully. Not only do elites in many countries simply resist 
such observation and measurement (cf. Wilhelm, 1980; McDonough, 1981), but the 
survey and other research techniques available today are often too expensive or 
too superficial to capture the subtle complexities and to penetrate the routine 
secrecy of much elite behavior. While it may be premature to conclude that the 
data necessary to a relatively comprehensive delineation of elites are perman­
ently beyond our grasp, it is likely that progress will depend mainly on treating
The St a tes of National Elites an d th e S t abi 1 i t y of



























































































elites as a theoretical construct whose properties and effects can only be 
Verified indirectly.
This article theorizes about a determinate relationship between states 
of national elites, which comprise one aspect of an elite construct, and the 
observable stability or instability of national political institutions. We 
postulate that, within a defined universe, institutional stability or instability 
depends on the particular state of a country's national elite. Stability or 
instability persists until there is a transformation in this state, after which 
a new institutional condition emerges. However, transformations in the states 
of national elites appear to depend on rare, historically contingent circumstances 
which permit elite initiatives and elite reorganizations. This means that 
changes in the stability or instability of political institutions are much less 
influenced by socioeconomic variables (e.g. levels of development, urbanization, 
education), sociopolitical variables (e.g. mass attitudes, political culture 
and political participation) or international variables (e.g. location in the 
world-system) than has commonly been thought. The implication for policy is 
that efforts to foster stable political institutions must focus on bringing 
about circumstances in which appropriate elite transformations might occur.
We begin by considering the principal features of an elite construct as 
it pertains to a general theory of elites and politics. Next we link this 
construct to observable conditions of institutional stability and instability.
W’e then define and analyze a universe, consisting of 81 nation-states between 
1950-1982, in which the postulated relationships between states of elites and 
institutional conditions could be expected to hold. Finally, we discuss some
vof the theoretical and policy implications of our analysis.
An Elite Construct
The term "elite" is now widely agreed to refer to those persons who are 
able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to




























































































subsumes strategic position-holders in a variety of organizations ranging 
from business enterprises to trade unions, from the military to the media, 
and from various "established” political parties and interest groups to 
assorted "dissident" or "radical" movements whose leaders affect national 
policies mainly through resistance and negation (Parry, 1969, p.13; Merritt,
1970, p.105; Giddens, 1973, p.120; Dye, 1976, p.6; Putnam, 1976, p.lA). To 
identify elites empirically the strong tendency in recent studies has been to 
supplement an organizational-positional identification with snowball sampling 
and network analysis to ensure comprehensiveness (Kadushin, 1968; Bonilla, 1970; 
Barton et al., 1973; Higley et al., 1979; Moore, 1979; Hoffmann-Lange, 1982).
This is where scholarly agreement largely ends, however. The theoretical 
status of elites is as much up for grabs today as it was when Pareto, Mosca 
and Michels were writing. Elites do not comprise a recognized construct 
(analogous, for example, to the constructs of social class and "the state") in 
theories which seek to explain major political variations among countries. We 
have elsewhere inquired into the ideological and meta-theoretical reasons for 
this (Field and Higley, 1980); here we want to examine certain key features of an 
elite construct.
The basic rationale for utilizing an elite construct in any general 
political theory is the idea that elite structure and behavior vary independently 
of non-elite and international conditions and influences, and that this indepen­
dent variation of elites has determinate effects on central political processes 
and outcomes. To encapsulate this, an elite construct must first conceptualize 
the different states which national elites take in modern societies. Recent 
research on the extent of structural integration/fragmentation and of value 
consensus/dissensus within national elites (see the studies summarized by Putnam, 
1976, pp.107-132) has pointed to something like the following conceptualization:
Disunified elites: Integration and consensus are absent and most elite
persons consequently perceive government executive power to depend on one 



























































































an,eng elite factions is ruthless, and widespread or sustained cooperation 
among them is out of the question.
Imperfectly unified elites: Integration and consensus do not extend to all
major elite factions and there is a clear disjunction between a large, elec- 
torally dominant faction or coalition of factions, which possesses substantial 
internal integration and consensus, and a somewhat smaller "radical" faction, 
which is openly hostile to the larger grouping, but which regularly fails to 
obtain enough support to gain full executive power (Field and Higley, 1978). 
Consensually unified elites: Integration and consensus are sufficiently
extensive so that, wdiile elite factions regularly and publicly express 
conflicting policies and ideologies, they consistently refrain from pushing 
their partisan differences to the point of violent conflict. Apparently, 
there is an underlying value consensus, involving an unwritten code of elite 
conduct (Prewitt and Stone, 1973, pp.151-155; Di Palma, 1973, pp.10-13), 
which is sustained by an elite interaction structure that is broadly satis­
factory to all major factions (Higley and Moore, 1981).
Ideologically unified elites: Integration and consensus are apparently so
comprehensive that all elite factions publicly profess the same ideology 
and consistently conform their policy statements to the ideologically- 
rationalized policy lines laid down by the most senior officials (Brzezinski 
and Huntington, 1963, pp.17-56; Lindblom, 1977, pp.237-275).
As explained below, each of these states of national elites is associated 
with a distinctive condition of institutional stability or instability. Countries 
located within a specific universe (also discussed below) may thus be classified 
according to the state of their national elite and their institutional condition. 
But if it is to constitute an explanatory device, an elite construct must also 
conceptualize the ways in which the states of national elites vary independently 
of non-elite and international influences. This means that contentions about 




























































































To take the question of origins first, an elite construct must specify the 
kinds of circumstances in which elite states are created and transformed.
Although the open-endedness of ongoing historical processes, and therefore 
the possibility of future novelties, prevents any complete or final enumeration 
of such circumstances, the political history of the last four centuries (i.e., 
since modern nation-states first emerged) suggests that they are few in number 
and highly special in character..
The state of disunity originates in the severe conflicts and enmities 
which usually precede or at least accompany the formation of sovereign nation­
states. In this respect it is the initial state which national elites normally 
take. Thus the first eight European nation-states to emerge at the end of
the medieval period —  Denmark, England, France, Portugal, Russia, Scotland,
2Spain and Sweden —  began with disunified elites. Similarly, most nation­
states which later came into existence —  for example, all the Latin American 
countries, Austria, Italy and Germany —  had disunified elites at their outset. 
Although the state of elite disunity can originate in transformations of the 
three other elite states, historical data suggest that most transformations have 
been from this state to the three other states.
The state of imperfect unity originates in the realization by "conser­
vative" and "moderate" elite factions in a disunified elite that there is a 
reliably non-radical electoral majority at their disposal and that they no longer 
need to use crude force and repression in order to protect their interests.
Given the continuing radicalism of other elite factions, it is enough for the 
conservative and moderate factions to follow roughly democratic practices to wTin
^To describe and document the circumstances which have actually occurred is 
beyond this article's scope. We have attempted to do this in our Elites and 
Western Power (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). Here we merely character­
ize the circumstances and allude to their occurrence in various countries.
2From their independence in the 1580s until 1814, the United Provinces, which 
comprised what we now know as the Netherlands, had a much looser territorial 




























































































and hold governmental power. Examples are Norwegian elites once the radical 
Labor Movement began to emerge after 1S84, an altogether similar situation 
among Danish elites at the introduction of cabinet responsibility to parliament 
in 1901, as well as Italian and Japanese elites from the early post-World War II
years.
The state of consensual unity seems to originate in three circumstances 
only: (1) The factions in a disunified elite may deliberately negotiate a
settlement of their major disputes if their internal organization permits 
negotiation and if they have a sufficient incentive (such as the inconclusive 
outcome of a civil war and the prospect of its resumption) to do so. Examples 
are the settlements negotiated by English elites in 1689, by Swedish elites in 
1809, and by Mexican elites in the early 1930s. (2) If the native or settler
elites in a colonial territory have had considerable opportunity to practice 
moderate, more or less representative politics in colonial governments or in 
the structures of large independence movements, they may emerge as a consensually 
unified elite upon gaining national independence. Examples are the elites of 
Holland and some of the other United Provinces in throwing off Spanish rule, 
American elites before and during the War of Independence, and, more recently,
New Zealand, Canadian, Australian, South African, Irish, Philippino, Indian 
and Israeli elites. (3) The smaller "radical" faction in an imperfectly 
unified elite may gradually moderate its radicalism enough to win national 
elections, to form governments and to be accepted as a no longer threatening 
political alternative to the larger, previously dominant faction or coalition. 
Examples are the peaceful acceptance of Socialist-dominated coalition governments 
in Norway and Denmark during the 1930s.
Finally, the state of ideological unity originates in the victory of a 
radical egalitarian elite faction during the levelling revolutions that sometimes 
occur in predominantly peasant societies (the Russian Bolsheviks in 1921, the 




























































































during the counter-revolutionary ciicnnstnnccs that sometimes occur in largely 
industrialized societies (the Italian Fascists in 1926, the German Nazis in 
1933), or by a country which already has such an elite imposing it on other 
countries which it conquers in warfare (Eastern Europe and North Korea after 
World War II).
This overview suggests that transformations in the states of national 
elites do not occur as a consequence of systematic variations in non-elite 
or international conditions. Instead, they occur in contingent and rare 
circumstances which enable elites to alter their previous relations or which 
permit one faction to eliminate all its competitors. The one partial exception 
is the transformation from the disunified to the imperfectly unified state, 
for which the existence of a non-radical electoral majority (and therefore, 
presumably, a relatively high level of industrialization and prosperity) seems 
to be a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition.
The contentions that there are basically only four states of national 
elites and that transformations from one state to another occur only in con­
tingent and rare circumstances imply a third contention. This is that each 
elite sta*-e strongly tends to persist over time regardless of other changes 
in a country’s socioeconomic and sociopolitical makeup. Here too, the open-
e
endedness of history prevents any flat statements. But the contention is quite 
consistent wTith the modern historical record. Down to 1950, we can find only 
three clear instances in which disunified elites transformed themselves into 
consensually unified elites (England 1689, Sweden 1809, and Mexico about 1933), 
and we find only four similarly clear instances of transformations from the 
disunified to the ideologically unified state (Russia 1921, Italy 1926, Germany 
1933, and China 1949). Apart from those countries which gained independence 
with consensually unified elites (e.g. the United States, Canada), the state 
of elite disunity persisted nearly everywhere else from the time of nation-state 



























































































in:>rnational warfare are put outside the universe (as will be done presently), 
down to 1950 we can find no cases of a transformation from the consensually 
unified or ideologically unified states to another elite state. In short, all 
three states of national elites display a marked persistence once they are 
created. Only the state of imperfect elite unity seems to be less persistent, 
although this is still a fairly recent phenomenon and there are comparatively 
few cases on which to base a judgement. Even then, the imperfectly unified 
state persisted for several, decades in Norway and Denmark, and it has persisted 
throughout the postwar period in Italy and Japan (discussed below).
To summarize, an elite construct incorporating the contentions we have 
set forth is potentially a powerful explanatory device. The four states of 
national elites, the contingent, eminently political, circumstances in which 
they originate, and their marked persistence comprise a construct whose cogency 
is an attractive alternative to many competing explanations of major variations 
among political systems. We now want to pursue this potential by linking the 
construct to one such variation, the stability and instability of national 
political institutions.
Elites and Political Institutions
Political institutions are the formal organizations and procedures 
through which the processing of political demands and allocations is intended 
to occur in a society (Huntington and Dominquez, 1975, p.47). Their core consists 
of the executive, legislative and judicial bodies, the agencies and the procedures 
of government that are prescribed by constitution or by custom. Institutional 
stability is indicated by the prolonged absence of irregular seizures or attempted 
seizures of governmental office by force (e.g. coups, uprisings, revolutions) and 
by the absence of any common expectation that such seizures are likely to occur. 
Institutional instability is indicated by the recent occurrence or widely expected 




























































































we are inclined to interpret the emergency and other measures which incumbent 
chief executives sometimes take in order to extend their tenures in office as 
not indicating institutional instability. In such situations, instability is 
indicated only when other elite factions retaliate by mounting attempts to 
unseat the incumbent by force.
We postulate that each of the four states of national elites is reliably 
associated with a distinctive condition of institutional stability or in­
stability. WTiere the state of disunified elites exists, politics are punctuated 
by violent grabs for power and by repressions of defeated groups vTith little or 
no regard for institutional patterns and procedures. Institutions are merely 
used to strengthen and weaken the positions of warring elite factions. Con­
sequently, their pattern oscillates suddenly and unpredictably from "democratic" 
to "dictatorial" or vice versa. Even where a particular institutional pattern 
is quite long-lasting, perhaps extending over several decades, it is widely 
seen among elite persons as incapable of surviving a major political crisis, and 
such a crisis is regarded as inevitable.
In earlier times the institutional pattern that was usually associated 
v-ith disunified elites was a strictly traditional monarchy. This included a 
"court'1 comprised of most elite persons who were not out of favor and therefore 
: ;t in hiding or exile. Politics consisted mainly of intrigues aimed at using
the monarchical power for sectional or personal interests. This institutional 
pattern must not be confused, however, with that of so-called "crowned republics", 
such as England after 1689 and Sweden after 1809, in which the monarch is clearly 
seen as less than sovereign by most elite persons. The latter institutional 
pattern has usually been a concomitant of consensually unified elites.
Because of the discrediting and decline of hereditary monarchy, strictly 
traditional monarchies are no longer the principal institutional pattern associ­
ated with disunified elites. Instead, this elite state is now linked with a 
variety of patterns, including some that are formally representative and more 




























































































ultimate de facto power resides in the military. Elites and other informed 
observers are aware that some military faction is likely to seize power 
if policies do not please military leaders. In fact, the pattern most fre­
quently associated with disunified elites in modern conditions is that of avowed 
rule by a military officer or junta. One military coup frequently follows 
another without any real change in this pattern occurring.
By contrast, where the state of imperfectly unified elites exists, the 
repeatedly demonstrated electoral dominance of conservative and moderate elite 
factions strongly discourages irregular seizures of power that would obviously 
fly in the face of a majority of voters. At the same time, such actions are 
unnecessary for the elites who command this majority. Institutions are thus 
stable and generally representative-democratic in pattern. However, the dis- 
sidence and radicalism of the smaller elite faction is frequently manifested in 
large-scale strikes, demonstrations, riots and other actions which protest or 
seek to sabotage government policies. As a result, the stability of institutions 
is widely felt to be precarious and it is seen to depend, occasionally or 
frequently, on the use of emergency powers, the temporary imposition of martial 
law, and on other departures from representative-democratic procedures.
Where the state of consensually unified elites exists, politics are 
characterized by restraint, compromise, and by at least tacit elite cooperation 
to conceal, distort and otherwise de-fuse potentially explosive conflicts.
Elites regularly invoke institutional legalities and procedural niceties to 
keep the lid on them. The institutional condition is one of marked stability, 
as indicated by the conspicuous absence of coups d’etat and other irregular 
seizures of power. Executive office is transmitted peacefully either at the 
expiration of regular terms or when the incumbent dies or resigns.
The institutional pattern associated with consensually unified elites 
is some version of a representative republic, with or without a monarchical, 
but non-sovereign, head. However, the degree of effective representative 




























































































from most citizens and political institutions may remain the club-like 
preserve of the major elite factions. But under propitious economic conditions 
the restrained politics carried on by consensually unified elites tends to 
open the way to rather high degrees of representative government based on 
universal suffrage. An exception is where some basic ethnic conflict leads 
to the refusal of a dominant ethnic group to grant the suffrage and other 
rights to a subordinate group.
Finally, where the state of ideologically unified elites exists, the 
insistence on ideological and policy conformity results in a sharp centraliza­
tion of elite interaction in a single party or organization, and this strongly 
inhibits the formation of powerful anti-system factions. There is, consequently 
a high degree of institutional stability in the sense that overt seizures of 
power by force seldom (if ever) occur. But the pretense that there is only one 
"correct" ideological solution to policy dilemmas tends to generate a "cult of 
personality" and this in turn contributes to intense behind-the-scenes jockeying 
and fighting between different personalities and cliques in which losers are 
often destroyed. The state of the elite does not permit much reform of insitutu 
tions in a representative-democratic direction.
We have now linked each of the four states of national elites to a dis­
tinctive institutional condition. Readily available historical and contemporary 
accounts of political events can be used to identify the institutional condition 
that obtains in a country. But the state of a country's national elite cannot 
be identified so straight-forwardly. Only an elaborate investigation of elite 
structure and behavior can sometimes uncover persuasive direct evidence of an 
elite state. For assorted political and practical reasons, however, such 
investigations cannot be carried out in most countries, and they are of course 
wholly unavailable for historical analysis. Verification of the postulated 
relationships between elite states and institutional conditions therefore 
depends on evidence that bears out those contentions in the elite construct 




























































































postulated relationships can only be verified indirectly by showing that the 
construct’s logical consequences accord with observable continuities and changes 
in the institutional conditions of many countries.
Classification of 81 Nations, 1950-1982 
A theory purporting to explain variations in institutional conditions 
in terms of variations in the states of national elites will, like any theory, 
be valid only within a specified universe. The theory we advance applies to 
nations which met the following three criteria during all or roost of the period 
1950-1982:
1. At least de facto independent of external political control by 1970:
The condition of political institutions in colonies and other dependent 
territories can presumably be explained only by reference to elites located 
in the imperial nations which rule them. This forces the exclusion of 18 
colonies, territorial dependencies and secessionist states (e.g. Angola, 
Bangladesh) which did not achieve de facto independence until after 1970 
and in which, as a result, the basic states of elites and institutional 
conditions have had little time to emerge. Also excluded under this 
criterion are the Russian satellite countries of Eastern Europe (plus 
Mongolia) in which elites tend to see their power as existing at the suff- 
rance of Russian authorities who have demonstrated a willingness to intervene
3with force if local political trends go against their desires (Mlynar, 1979).
2. Territorial integrity for most or all of the period: In countries experiencing
3Obviously, the politics of all countries are influenced in varying degree by 
external political authorities, whether these are agencies such as the Inter­
national Monetary Fund or foreign intelligence apparatuses such as the C.I.A. 
and the K.G.B. The location of the threshold beyond which external interference 
deprives a country of at least de facto independence is debatable. We locate it 
beyond the point where such interferences are sporadic and ambiguous in their 
impact and at which elites apparently see their power as directly shaped by a 




























































































prolonged civil war or territorial insurgency political institutions do not 
have a national reach and changes in them are effected mainly by military 
victories or defeats. This describes the situations of Chad, Kampuchea, 
Lebanon, Laos, Pakistan and Vietnam during much of the period under review, 
and it forces the exclusion of these six countries. However, countries 
whose territorial integrity was only briefly interrupted (e.g. South Korea 
1950-1953, Nigeria 1967-1970, Nicaragua 1978-1979) need not be excluded. 
Similarly, changes in institutional conditions resulting from the trans­
formations of elites following defeats in international warfare (e.g. the 
reorganization of German, Italian, Austrian and Japanese elites at the end 
of World War II) constitute ad hoc interruptions of the relationships on 
which the theory focuses and must be placed outside the universe in w’hich 
it operates.
3. Population size and/or occupational differentiation compatible with the
articulation of national elites by at least 1960: In countries with popula­
tions of less than one million and/or economies that are almost entirely 
agrarian (i.e., less than five percent of the work force outside agriculture), 
social and political organization tends to run along kinship and other ascrip- 
tive lines. Political power is often located in a leisured class or, where 
such a class is absent, in the citizenry as a whole. Very few persons 
devote their full-time attention to commanding complex bureaucratic organiza­
tions and to affecting national policies on the basis of such organizational 
power. Elites in the defined sense are thus not clearly present and political 
institutions tend to be indistinct (Middleton and Tait, 1958; Cohen and 
Middleton, 1967). There is also the practical difficulty that information 
about the politics of such countries is usually sparse. These considerations 
force the exclusion of 50 small and/or almost entirely agrarian countries 



























































































Eighty of the 169 countries and territories listed in the Political
Handbook of the World 1980 are excluded by these criteria. Data sufficient to 
determine the eligibility of another eight countries could not be found, and 
they must also be excluded. It is quite possible, of course, that further 
social change and research will reduce the number of exclusions significantly.
But for the moment we are left with 81 countries in which the hypothesized 
relationships between states of national elites and the stability or instability 
of political institutions could be expected to operate between 1950-1982.
In what follows, we classify countries according to their observable 
institutional condition(s) and the apparent state(s) of their national elites 
during these 32 years. We rely on a variety of sources, from newspaper reports 
of political events which we have recorded in country files over the years, 
through compendia such as Facts on File and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
to studies by individual scholars, though we will cite only the last source.
Space limitations permit us to discuss in any detail only those countries 
which seem most difficult to classify and which may therefore be regarded as the 
"limiting cases" for each category. The countries in which a change in 
institutional condition occurred, and which comnriso especially crucial tests 
of the theory, will be discussed at slightly greater length. However, it should 
be obvious that this brief treatment of a sweeping range of political phenomena 
must necessarily be somewhat provisional. It would not be surprising if specialist 
knowledge of particular countries might prove some of our classifications wrong. 
But we see no alternative to plunging in and trying for a first approximation 
since country specialists cannot be expected to utilize and perhaps improve our 
classifications until they are persuaded that the scheme merits their attention.
Countries with unstable institutions and disunified elites throughout the period.
The following AO countries appeared to have unstable political institutions 



























































































































Senegal (from 1960) 








Yemen Arab Republic 
Yemen P.D.R. (from 1967)
In seven of these countries —  Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Nepal 
and Saudi Arabia —  power was concentrated in a traditional monarch for most or 
all of the period. Other elite factions sought to dislodge these monarchs 
through assassinations, coups and uprisings. In Afghanistan, Iran and Libya
anti-royalist factions eventually prevailed and established military or theocratic 
regimes which then engaged in wholesale repression of their opponents. However,
monarchs in Jordan, Morocco, Nepal and Saudi Arabia survived efforts to displace 
them by executing, imprisoning or otherwise forcibly containing their opponents. 
In all seven countries the form and functioning of political institutions 
depended strictly on the ability of one or another elite faction to maintain
or gain ascendancy by force.
Except that a monarch played little or no role, unstable institutions and 
elite disunity were equally evident in at least 30 of the remaining 33 countries 
listed. Where governmental power in these countries was not overtly in the 
hands of the military for most of the period (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, 




























































































raonarchs" (e.g. Nasser and Sadat in Egypt, the Duvaliers in Haiti, the 
Somozas in Nicaragua, Stroessner in Paraguay, Senghor in Senegal, Chiang 
Kai-shek and son in Taiwan) or in factions of various "revolutionary" fronts 
and parties (e.g. the FLN in Algeria, the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, 
the NLF in Yemen P.D.R.), both of the latter arrangements being directly 
dependent on military support. In all these countries it was fairly obvious 
that competing elite factions were regularly engaged in efforts to overthrow 
the currently dominant faction(s) by force. Institutions were consequently 
highly unstable and only Taiwan, which was in the grip of an extremely tight 
dictatorship, escaped at least one coup or other irregular seizure of power 
by force during the period. Popularly elected governments succeeded each 
other for a substantial portion of the period in just five of the 30 countries: 
Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece and Turkey.
Unstable institutions and disunified elites were less evident in three 
remaining countries: Chile, Portugal and Spain. It is at least arguable
that other classifications could be applied to those elites and institutions 
during part of the period under review. In this respect the three countries 
constitute limiting cases, and it is necessary to analyze them briefly.
Chile: Before the bloody coup of 1973, Chile was credited with one of the
longest periods of non-violent politics and uninterrupted representative govern­
ment in Latin American history, that is 40 years. Although considerable power 
was concentrated in the presidency, as has been usual in Latin American govern­
ments, legislative, judicial and civil service bodies, as well as numerous 
political parties, had real importance. Between 1932 and 1970 nine presidents 
succeeded one another in accordance with constitutional procedures. Chilean 
institutions had at least the appearance of those that are associated with 
consensually unified elites. Nevertheless, this appearance belied an underlying 
state of elite disunity and institutional instability. Like France during the 




























































































Virtually from the country's inception in 1817, power had been con­
centrated in a distinct landed oligarchy which operated a long string of 
authoritarian governments, beginning with the installation of a military 
junta in 1S29. Elite disunity was subsequently evident in an attempted 
coup and an unsuccessful insurrection during the 1850s, in a brief civil 
war in 1881, in the formation of a strong revolutionary socialist party in 
1912, in a military coup in 1924, and in an essentially military regime which 
ended in much political upheaval during 1931-1932. Thus the period of political 
peace that ensued after 1932 was not based on any prior unification of the 
national elite. An extreme right-wing faction centering on elements of the 
military and on the former military ruler, Ibanez, existed during the 1950s.
The underlying disunity of elites was also evident in the postwar resurgence 
of the Socialist Party, which advocated a revolutionary road to power, and in 
the imprisonment of Communist Party leaders between 1948 and 1958. In the 
words of one specialist, the configuration of Chilean politics during the 
decades after 1932 was actually one of "polarized pluralism" which gave rise 
to a "pervasive feeling of permanent crisis" (Valenzuela, 1978, pp.8, 19).
It should therefore have come as no surprise that once one of the mo ;e 
extreme elite factions, in this case a coalition of the Socialist and Communist 
parties led by Salvador Allende, gained government office, the underlying state 
of elite disunity would quickly become manifest. Failing to obtain a majority 
of votes in the 1970 elections, Allende was confirmed as president by Congress 
only after he agreed to support a constitutional amendment which guaranteed 
civil liberties and democratic procedures. His government immediately began to 
redistribute incomes, greatly expand public sector spending, and nationalize 
parts of the private sector. It increasingly tolerated acts of revolutionary 
violence, such as land seizures by peasant bands. These and other actions 
brought the historic enmities among Chilean elites to a boil. After attempts 
to reach compromises with Allende failed, center and right-wing factions in 




























































































was killed, along with many of his supporters, in the coup of September 1973.
The military dictatorship that followed abolished the constitution and eliminated, 
through executions and imprisonment, nearly all publicly dissident elite persons 
and their organizations.
Portugal: The concentration of power in a traditional monarchy until its
overthrow in 1910, the intense factionalism of a chaotic republican regime 
that was terminated by military revolt in 1926, and the persistence of a 
basically military dictatorship (although headed publicly by two civilians,
Salazar and Caetano) until its overthrow by military coup in 1974, clearly 
indicated a state of elite disunity and a condition of institutional instability 
throughout Portugal's modern history. What is at issue is whether this is 
still the case today.
The left-leaning Armed Forces Movement, which seized power in 1974, 
set up an interim junta and allowed constituent assembly elections to take 
place the following year. By that time serious divisions within the military 
leadership were apparent. Left-wing parties failed to win a majority of votes 
in the 1975 elections and their democratic credibility was tarnished when leftist 
military units staged an unsuccessful uprising later in the year. Since 1976 
Portuguese politics have been pacific and governmental power has been contested 
and held in accordance with parliamentary procedures. But durable government 
coalitions have been conspicuously absent and elections have been frequent.
In the elections of 1976, 1979 and 1980 right-of-centre parties belonging 
to the Democratic Alliance steadily increased their electoral support and con­
trolled a majority of parliamentary seats after 1979. Support for the Socialist 
Party declined and that for the Communist Party fluctuated around the 15 percent 
mark. It is therefore possible that essentially conservative elite factions 
are coming to control enough electoral support to ensure their continued 
political dominance without resort to irregular seizures of power. On this 




























































































unity, and Portugal's unstable institutions may therefore be acquiring a 
precarious stability. However, the continued importance of the constitutionally- 
prescribed but non-elective Council of the Revolution, the body of military 
officers established in 1974 to "supervise" the country's transition to "socialist 
democracy", indicates that power is still substantially concentrated in the 
military elite and that, for the moment, institutions are best classified as 
unstable and the elite as disunified.
Spain: A traditional monarchy, which had survived chaotic politics during
the nineteenth century, and which had degenerated into a straight-forward 
military dictatorship during the 1920s, ended with the monarch's exile in 1931.
The long-standing disunity of Spanish elites was then manifested in a turbulent 
republican interlude ending in a bitter civil war during which military forces 
led by General Franco conquered the country. Franco consolidated his victory 
in an exceptionally thorough-going dictatorship which lasted until his death 
in 1975. Often described as a fascist totalitarian regime, the character of 
Franco's dictatorship raises the question of whether the state of Spanish elites 
was ideologically unified or disunified, and therefore of whether the stability 
of institutions was real or merely apparent during most of the period undf t 
review.
For reasons that have most famously been given by Linz (1964), the 
state of Spanish elites during Franco's hegemony actually fell somewhat short 
of ideological unity. Franco's political apparatus,the Falange, never became 
sufficiently inclusive of all elite position-holders or sufficiently coherent 
ideologically to stifle the public expression of skeptical, sometimes even 
dissenting, views about policy questions by center and right-of-center elite 
factions. The Falange was more an appendage of elite power than the principal 
vehicle for its organization. Moreover, it was always apparent that deeply 
opposed elite factions and sentiments were in existence underground. As in 




























































































indicated that the state of the national elite remained disunified despite 
Franco's hegemony. Clear manifestations of institutional instability could 
therefore be expected once Franco's hold on power was gone.
After Franco's death, King Juan Carlos I ascended to the throne. Despite 
the restrictive features of the institutional structure v’hich Franco left 
behind him, the king and various political leaders managed to hold general 
elections in 1977 and 1979 and to have a democratic constitution adopted by 
popular vote in 1978. Right-of-center parties won a majority of parliamentary 
seats and confronted a large Socialist Party and a small Communist Party in 
opposition. Much extreme right-wing hostility towards the new regime emerged, 
however, and military revolt v?as widely seen as a distinct possibility, while 
terrorist actions (not all of them perpetrated by Basques seeking independence) 
were frequent. In early 1981 a military coup was actually attempted but failed. 
Thus the disunified state of the Spanish national elite remains unchanged, and 
political institutions are basically unstable.
Countries with stable institutions and consensually unified elites throughout 
the period.
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Rhodesia (until 1979) 
Singapore (from 1965)







The United Kingdom 
The United States 
West Germany
In nearly all these countries elite factions regularly and publicly expressed 




























































































parties, interest groups and other partisan organizations and movements. With 
very few exceptions, however, conflicts among elites and their supporters were 
restrained and moderate, and irregular seizures of power by force were very 
widely viewed as unlikely, almost unthinkable events.
UTiere it has been carried out in these countries, research has uncovered 
evidence of an underlying elite consensus on existing institutional arrangements 
and on informal rules of political conduct: in Australia (Higley et al., 1979),
Canada (Presthus, 1973; Ornstein and Stevenson, 1981), the Netherlands (Lijphart, 
1968; Eldersveld, 1981), Norway (Higley et al., 1976), Sweden (Anton, 1980), 
Switzerland (Kerr, 1974), the United Kingdom (Putnam, 1973), the United States 
(McClosky, 1964; Barton, 1974, 1980), and West Germany (Wildenmann, 1971). 
Although less investigated, an integrated structure of elite interaction that is 
probably supportive of this consensus has also been traced; in Australia and 
the United States (Higley and Moore, 1981), Canada (Presthus, 1973), Israel 
(Weingrod and Gurevitch, 1976), Norway (Maktutredningen, 1982), Sweden (Anton, 
1980) and West Germany (Hoffman-Lange et al., 1978).
At least 14 of these countries had stable representative democratic 
institutions throughout the period. Although the exact institutional forms 
varied as between cabinet and presidential, unitary and federal systems, there 
v?as a uniform pattern in which legislative and executive power passed peacefully 
and on the basis of regular popular elections between competing parties and 
factions. Civil liberties and other constitutional guarantees were reliably 
observed, and political dissidence rarely went beyond non-violent, lawful 
demonstrations and protests.
But the consensually unified state of national elites permits several 
variations in elite organization, and it is not everywhere associated with the 
degree of representative democracy that Americans or Swedes or New Zealanders 
have come to regard as the ’natural' shape of politics. Thus the consensual 




























































































a single omnibus political party which monopolized government offices and 
which afforded all major elite factions channels of influence. This arrange­
ment kept political institutions immune to irregular seizures of power by 
force, but it also made representative democratic processes rather perfunctory.
We have in mind the integration of Mexican elites in the P.R.I. and its 
political hegemony throughout the period (Purcell and Purcell, 1980), the 
dominance of Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party in Singapore from 
the country's inception in 1965 (Bedlington, 1978), the similar dominance of 
Nyerere and the T.A.N.U. party (after 1977 the Revolutionary Party) in Tanzania 
since independence in 1961 (Pratt, 1978), and the hold which Bourguiba and the 
Destourian Socialist Party have had on Tunisian politics since 1956 (Stone,
1982). Although the governments in these countries are probably correctly 
thought of as somewhat authoritarian, the stability of political institutions, 
the absence of any large anti-system elite factions, and the absence of a 
single ideology or policy position to which all elites must publicly adhere, 
indicate that the four national elites are best classified as consensually 
unified.
In fcur countries with ethnica?.ly divided populations elites also 
appeared to be consensually unified and institutions were stable, even though 
keeping the lid on potentially explosive ethnic conflicts or maintaining one 
ethnic group's dominance involved substantial limitations on the practice of 
representative democracy. After independence in 1963, elites in Malaysia 
managed to contain severe divisions among Malay, Chinese and Indian population 
segments and to operate a weakly consolidated federal political system in rough 
accord with democratic procedures learned under British tutelage. However, 
efforts to limit the Chinese community’s influence have pointed towards political 
hegemony by the National Front coalition, and outbreaks of ethnic rioting (most 
notably in 1969) plus local insurgencies have resulted in temporary suspensions 
of parliamentary government (Means, 1976). Likewise, in Sri Lanka a national 




























































































is publicly divided on ideological and policy questions gives evidence of 
underlying consensus (Jupp, 1978: pp.44-49, 332-369). Accordingly, and in 
spite of somewhat extreme policy conflicts among elites, power has passed 
peacefully between a more conservative and a more radical faction or coalition 
in a series of eight elections which have usually been won by the faction then 
in opposition. During 1971, however, a very severe revolt by young radicals, 
who were mainly of rural Sinhalese extraction, was repressed only through 
draconian measures and with the logistical support of a variety of foreign 
powers.
Within the politics of the dominant white populations of South Africa 
and, until 1979, Rhodesia, the state of national elites was consensually 
unified and institutions were stable. Different factions regularly and 
publicly opposed each other but appeared to share an underlying consensus 
about the rules of the (white) political game. Accordingly, power passed, 
or was expected to pass, peacefully among successive chief executives, the 
civil liberties and rights associated with representative democratic politics 
tended to be observed within the dominant ethnic groups, and irregular seizures 
of power by discontented elite factions were regarded as distinctly unlikely.
But when measured by the political situations of their entire populations, both 
national elites obviously operated highly authoritarian regimes.
Finally, the stability of political institutions and the consensually 
unified state of national elites are open to more question in three countries —  
India, Jamaica and the Philippines —  which may therefore be treated as the 
limiting cases for this classification:
India: Between 1947 and 1969 all major elite factions colluded to keep the
Congress Party thoroughly dominant in national politics. The organizational 
manifestation of the elite's consensual unity thus resembled that of Mexican 
elites. Mrs Ghandi became prime minister in 1966 and presided over an 



























































































assumed what amounted to dictatorial powers, even to the extent of imprisoning 
some of her political rivals. Though technically (under our scheme) not an 
irregular seizure of power, this action comprised such a break with the Indian 
tradition of elite cooperation as to suggest the onset of elite disunity 
(Kleiman, 1981). However, Ghandi then held parliamentary elections in March 
1977 and was defeated. Normal government processes were restored by a weak 
coalition of her opponents, and this coalition exacted few reprisals for their 
previous repression. Apparently, most elite factions wanted to return to the 
pre-1975 arrangement. The Janata coalition disintegrated over the next two 
-years and Ghandi, now leading her own loyalists in the Congress Party, won the 
parliamentary elections of January 1980. She has governed since in accordance 
with the informal code of conduct and governmental practices characteristic 
of the pre-1975 period. Despite the dramatic hiatus of 1975-1977, which stemmed 
in no small part from the growing ethnic, religious, regional and other divisions 
of the Indian population, the consensually unified state of the national elite 
appears to have been maintained, and Indian political institutions have remained 
stable.
Jamaica 1962-1982: Since independence in 1962, Jamaican politics have increas-
ngly involved serious disorders and repressive measures. A wide ideological 
and policy gap appears to separate the elite factions associated with the 
Labour Party and those centering on the People's National Party (PNP). Acts of 
violence between the two sides, such as routinely occur wiiere elites are 
disunified, have been relatively frequent. Nevertheless, the major elite 
factions have cooperated to contain explosive racial issues, governmental 
power has continued to depend on parliamentary support, and there is evidence 
that the two major parties and factions are still disposed to negotiate con­
stitutional questions (Stone, 1981). In the 1980 elections a PNP government 
was displaced by a Labour Party government. There is thus no clear indication 
that the state of the national elite is other than consensually unified, and 




























































































The Philippines: Elites have been preoccupied with putting down various
communist, ethnic and regional insurgencies virtually since the attainment 
of independence in 1946. Practices learned under American tutelege and 
associated with the consensually unified state of elites allowed power to 
pass peacefully, on the basis of party competition and popular elections, 
between six presidents, the last of whom, Marcos,, was re-elected in 1969.
In the face of renewed and continuing insurgencies, Marcos assumed dictatorial 
powers during 1972-1973, instituting a new constitution and engineering a 
referendum which extended his presidential tenure indefinitely. Marcos's 
subsequent imprisonment or exile of numerous opponents, his party's use of 
strong-arm tactics to influence elections and referenda, and his continuation 
of martial law until 1980 strongly resemble the measures followed where 
elites are disunified. However, various elite factions publicly express dis­
agreements with the Marcos government and none has mounted a serious effort 
to seize power by force. Possibly, the fear of territorial disintegration is 
uppermost for the national elite, to the point where all major factions are 
prepared to tolerate, more or less indefinitely, Marcos's relatively unbridled 
rule.
Countries with stable institutions and ideologically unified elites throughout 
the period.
When Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Mongolia 
are excluded on the ground that they have not been de facto independent of 
foreign control, the following six countries appeared to have stable political 
institutions operated by ideologically unified elites between 1950-1982:
Albania North Korea U.S.S.R.
China Romania Yugoslavia
Dating from the victories of radical-egalitarian elite factions in conditions 
of revolution and/or civil war (i.e., U.S.S.R. 1921, Albania and Yugoslavia 1945, 




























































































supremacy (i.e., Romania 1946, North Korea 1946), elites in these countries 
have espoused a single ideology in their public utterances and have been 
organized in sharply centralized "vanguard" parties that effectively penetrate 
all important societal spheres. The only direct study that has been carried 
out, that of the Yugoslav elite during 1968 (Barton et al., 1973), describes a 
uniformity of ideological view and a centralization of elite interaction that 
are broadly consistent with this characterization.
Where this state of elites exists, factional conflicts occur covertly 
within the party and state apparatus and are usually won by those incumbent 
in the uppermost party positions. Defeated factions and their supporters are 
normally eliminated. The tenure of the uppermost leaders therefore tends to 
be long, and elite factionalism comes to the fore mainly upon their deaths.
Though it is common to speak of coups and attempted coups (e.g. the dismissal 
of Khrushchev in 1964), what is usually meant is the jockeying of individuals 
and small cliques for ascendancy, rather than one faction's outright seizure 
of governmental power by force. Because of its tight organization, such full­
blown coups rarely, if ever, occur where a national elite is ideologically 
unified. None has clearly occurred in the six countries under review, and, 
consequently, their political institutions can be classified as stable throughout 
the period.
If there are any limiting cases in this category, they are Yugoslavia 
and China. A sharply decentralized federal system built on deep ethnic-regional 
divisions within the Yugoslav population has promoted an increasing amount of 
factionalism within the national elite. Down to 1982 this continued to be 
offset by the monopoly position of the League of Communists at all levels of 
the political system. However, it is conceivable that centrifugal ethnic-regional 
forces will at some point produce territorial disintegration and thereby set the
^It is doubtful that Romania and North Korea were de facto independent of 
Russian control during the early part of the period. From about 1960, however, 




























































































country outside our theoretical universe. In China pronounced factionalism 
within the national elite followed the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Several 
reversals in the fortunes of individual leaders culminated in the dismissal 
and arrest of the so-called Gang of Four. This was evidently a major dispute 
over power and policy (Dittmer, 1980) which gave rise to public disturbances 
in Shanghai and some other areas. It was followed by a brief interlude when 
party control was publicly questioned by a relatively small number of people 
in Peking. Sometime before the Tenth Party Congress in 1978, however, the 
faction identified with Teng Ziao-ping consolidated its hold on power and 
began to enforce uniform elite and cadre support for its revisionist program 
of "the Four Modernizations". Tendencies towards elite disunity during 1976- 
1977 were reversed, the state of ideological unity persisted, and institutions 
remained stable.
Countries with stable institutions and imperfectly unified elites throughout 
the period.
Political institutions were also stable, although rather more precariously, 
in two countries whose elites appeared to be imperfectly unified between 1950- 
1982. They are:
Italy: Elite factions associated with the Christian Democratic Party and with
other centrist and right-of-center parties have had an uninterrupted hold on 
national government offices from the first postwar elections in 1948. During 
the earlier part of this period communist and socialist factions comprised an 
irreconcilable left wing. By the 1960s, however, the Socialists had moderated 
their position enough so that they could sometimes participate in Christian 
Democratic governments. Communist party, trade union and intellectual elites 
were left to cope with the repeatedly demonstrated existence of a firm anti­
communist electoral majority in national politics.
The communist elites gradually repudiated much of their traditional 




























































































compromise" with the Christian Democrats. But this tendency towards consensual 
unity among the principal elite factions was offset by the emergence of an 
especially fanatic and violent radicalism among disaffected communist intellec­
tuals and their youthful supporters. As a consequence, the highly disruptive 
left-wing strikes, protests and riots of the 1950s and 1960s were to some extent 
replaced during the 1970s by a wave of mainly left-wing terrorism. Throughout 
the period the obvious electoral dominance of center and right-of-center elites 
prevented attempted seizures of power by extreme right-wdng and left-wing 
factions, and political institutions remained stable. But the continuing 
ideological polarization of elites has made for notably ineffective government, 
political stalemate,, and widespread uncertainty that political institutions 
are capable of surviving a serious crisis (Di Palma, 1977).
Japan: The state of Japanese elites before World War II was disunified and
institutions were unstable. Power was concentrated in a traditional monarchy, 
the military, and in right-wing political and business families. During the 
1930s in particular, left-wing elites were suppressed and a "politics by 
assassination" culminated in the military revolt of 1937. Under post-war 
occupation by the United States most right-wing extremists were eliminated, 
the monarchy was reduced to a symbolic role, the military w’as disbanded, and 
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty was imposed.
From the start of postwar independence in 1952, factions centering on 
the Liberal Democratic Party, which failed to obtain parliamentary majorities 
only in the 1976 and 1979 elections, have been dominant. Elites associated 
with the fairly large Socialist Party and the smaller Communist Party have 
comprised a radical left wing throughout the period. The relative strength and 
radicalism of these left-wing factions ensured continuing political turbulence 
involving serious anti-government strikes and disorders and a limited amount of 
political terrorism (Pempel, 1977, pp.281-287; Tsurutani, 1977, pp.176-211). 



























































































radicalism during the 1970s, others maintained their intransigent opposition.
Thus the state of Japanese elites was imperfectly unified throughout the period 
and political institutions, though free from irregular seizures of power, had 
a somewhat precarious stability.
Countries exhibiting changed institutional conditions and elite transformations 
during the period.
Elite transformations and associated changes in institutional conditions 
appear to have occurred in eight countries between 1950-1982. During 1957 and 
1958 the long-standing disunity of Colombian and Venezuelan elites was trans­
formed into consensual unity. In a less clear-cut fashion, disunifiea French 
elites became imperfectly unified during the early 1960s and, probably, con- 
sensually unified some twenty years later. In Cuba the state of elite disunity 
was replaced by that of ideological unity during 1959. On the other hand, 
consensually unified elites in Nigeria and imperfectly unified elites in Uruguay 
became disunified in 1966 and 1973 respectively. Finally, Belgian elites went 
from imperfect unity to consensual unity in about 1960 and Austrian elites 
underwent a similar transformation half a dozen years later, in about 1966.
In ail cases, the pre-existing instabixity or stability of political institution 
changed fairly promptly according to the kind of elite transformation that had 
taken place. We must briefly summarize these significant events.
Colombia: Unstable institutions and elite disunity were apparent in a long
series of civil wars during the nineteenth century. However, elites associated 
with the Conservative and Liberal parties accepted each other's periods cf 
governmental ascendancy relatively peacefully between 1910 and the late 1940s, 
although strictly competitive elections occurred only twice during those years 
(Wilde, 1978, pp.29-32). The reform measures of Liberal governments after 
1930 increasingly frightened the Conservatives, who began to take reprisals
against the Liberals upon winning the presidency in 1946. In 1948 th ssina




























































































Conservative efforts to repress the Liberals led to the Rojas Find]la military 
dictatorship which was instituted by coup d’etat in 1953 and which ended when 
the military overthrew him in 1957 and set up a temporary junta. Clearly, 
institutional instability and elite disunity persisted to this point.
During 1956 and 1957, however, leaders of the two traditional sides of 
Colombian politics met privately, initially in Spain, and worked out a plan, 
called the National Front, for the strict sharing of power between Liberals and 
Conservatives over the next 16 years (Wilde, 1978, pp.58-62). Embodied in a 
formal declaration and ratified by plebiscite, the arrangement called for an 
equal distribution of seats in all important governmental bodies (both legis­
lative houses, the cabinet, departmental and municipal councils), and also, 
under a provision added in 1959, the alteration of the two traditional parties 
in the presidency itself. Elections continued within the Liberal and Conservative 
parties for seats in these bodies and, within the party whose turn it was, for 
the presidential nomination. During the next 16 years the two sides did in 
fact alternate in the presidency and otherwise abide by the agreement, although 
the Conservative presidential nominee in the 1970 election, Pastrama Borrero, 
barely withstood a populist challenge by the former dictator, Rojas Pinilla. 
Starting that year, the system of parities agreed to in 1957 was gradually 
phased out, also by agreement. Since 1974 presidential elections have been 
"free" of the National Front restrictions. However, the Liberal leader, Turbay, 
wTho only narrowly won the presidency in 1978, agreed to observe the spirit of 
the National Front in view of his small margin of victory.
It appears, then, that Colombian elites effected a transformation from 
the disunified to the consensually unified state in 1957. This did not lead 
immediately to a complete change in Colombian political life. Substantial 
violence continues down to the present, although much of this violence apparently 
derives from a lucrative traffic in narcotics shipments to the United States.




























































































tendency to avoid a breakdown of the bargain struck in that year. Although 
factions within the Liberal and Conservative parties occasionally opposed the 
National Front system, these factions seem to have changed their minds once 
they neared government office. Similarly, speeches conveying the most 
intransigent positions have often been followed by the speakers' agreements 
to do what they said they would never do. Taking this bombastic style of 
Colombian politics into account, the elite behavior patterns of the last 25 
years have been consistent with the state of consensually unified elites, and 
it is the case that formerly unstable institutions have been highly stable.
Venezuela: Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Venezuelan elites had virtually
no experience in operating representative political institutions prior to the 
1940s. A series of military leaders had ruled the country from independence in 
1830. One leader, Gomez, had been the effective ruler from 1908 until his death 
in 1935. During the confused mingling of military rule and tentative representa­
tive politics which followed, a populist and somewhat socialist elite faction, 
Democratic Action (AD), emerged and eventually wielded substantial power in a 
short-lived civilian-military junta led by the AD leader, Betancourt, between 
1945-1948. However, the military, fearing too rapid social change, overthrew 
this junta and exiled the AD leadership. Power in the military regime which 
ensued came to be concentrated in Perez Jiminez, who ruled corruptly,dictatorially 
and inefficiently from 1952 until 1958. Clearly, the state of the national elite 
was, and had always been, disunified, and political institutions were unstable.
The Jiminez dictatorship gave rise to much discontent among major elite 
factions. In December 1957 leaders of the three main political parties (AD,
COPEI, UPD) met in New York City with representatives of important Venezuelan 
business interests. The businessmen agreed to support a system of representative 
government in return for an assurance by the political leaders that issues would 
be kept moderate and that a direct attack on entrenched power would be avoided 




























































































overthrew Jiminez in January 1958 and a call for elections was issued. Sporadic 
resistance by right-wing military groups was eventually suppressed. Late in 
.1958 political party leaders agreed formally that, regardless of who won the 
elections, the new government would be a coalition. Betancourt won and managed 
to serve out his full term despite a left-wing insurgency and various splits 
and tensions within the AD and coalition ranks.
Five presidential elections have subsequently been held. Both leading 
parties, the AD and COPEI, have won and duly taken office. Political institutions 
have been stable ever since the elite settlement of 1957-1958, an event which 
constituted an elite transformation from the disunified to the consensually unified 
state (Levine, 1978).
France: The instability of political institutions was indicated by periodic
alternations between monarchical and republican regimes during the hundred 
years after the Revolution and by the crisis-ridden Third and Fourth Republics 
of this century. A pattern of deep ideological conflict between right-wing 
and left-wing elite factions before, during, and for long after the Revolution 
suggests that the state of the national elite was never other than disunified. 
Although a generally conservative electoral majority was probably in existence 
by the start of this century, the traditional revolutionary rhetoric and anti­
authoritarian attitudes of most political activists tended to conceal this basic 
feature of twentieth-century France.
In 1958 a military rebellion in Algeria that threatened to extend to 
the mainland opened up the clear prospect of civil war because left-wing elites 
could be counted upon to organize resistance to a military coup. As a way out 
of the crisis, de Gaulle, an ambiguous figure in terms of traditional French 
political style, was allowed by general elite consent to take office as prime 
minister. While modifying the constitution in a presidential direction (and 
becoming president) without suppressing political liberties, de Gaulle mobilized 




























































































measures and constitutional changes in subsequent plebiscites and elections. 
Although its specific support for de Gaulle was partly motivated by pragmatic 
considerations, the fundamentally conservative character of this majority was 
clearly evident in the sweeping victory which Gaullist forces von over the left 
in the parliamentary elections which followed the 1968 student uprising. De 
Gaulle resigned the following year when a referendum about essentially peripheral 
institutional changes was lost. Nevertheless, the pattern of strong, conservative 
presidential government with v*ide electoral support persisted for another 11 
years.
Although it can be given no precise date, a transformation in the state 
of the national elite from disunified to imperfectly unified occurred during 
the years immediately following de Gaulle's ascendance in 1958. From at least 
the November 1962 elections, when the Gaullists won an absolute majority in the 
National Assembly, center and right-of-center elite factions were clearly 
dominant electorally so long as left-wing factions continued to espouse 
sharply egalitarian programs and goals. However, the stability of political 
institutions was precarious. Various elite factions continued to question 
the legitimacy of existing institutions (Brown, 1969), and some of them 
encouraged, or acquiesced in, periodic mass protests and demonstrations of 
considerable size and vehemence.
The electoral dominance of center and right-of-center elites eventually 
brought about a modification of the radical position taken by left-wing elites. 
Manifested initially in the behavior of Communist Party leaders, who showed 
considerable moderation in their clear, if unavowed, support of de Gaulle 
against student radicals in 1968 and in subsequent, inconspicuous municipal 
politics, it w7as also indicated by the Communist Party's adoption of "Euro­
communist" doctrines in the late 1970s. More important, however, was the 
startling growth of the Socialist Party, v/hose modifications of many of the 
French left’s historic associations led to a sweeping Socialist victory in the 





























































































personnel in left-of-center elite circles. The repute of the new Socialist 
elite was quite different from that of the Communist leadership, whose dominance of 
the left was now supplanted. Thus it seems likely that the French elections of 
1981, followed by the Mitterrand government's generally placatory and cautious 
behavior, amount to a further transformation of the national elite, from 
imperfectly unified to consensually unified. On this reading, French political 
institutions should be more solidly stable in the years immediately ahead than 
they have been during the period of the elite's imperfect unity.
Cuba; The only period of plausibly representative politics in Cuban history 
—  eight years —  ended in 1952 when General Batista seized power for a second 
time by coup d'etat. Gradually losing the support of moderate elite factions, 
Batista maintained himself in office with highly repressive measures until 
he was forced to flee the country on the last day of 1958. Dovm to this point 
the Cuban elite had always been disunified and political institutions were 
clearly unstable.
From 1956 a guerrilla movement led by Fidel Castro was in the field.
Initially only one of many anti-Batista movements, the Castro forces' eventual 
pre-eminence was the result of luck, the accidental elimination of rivals, the 
support or forebearance of elites disenchanted with Batista, and the withdrawal 
of American military aid to the Cuban government in 1958 (Dominquez, 1978, pp. 
123-133). As Batista's army disintegrated, the Castro forces marched on Havanna 
and seized power on January 1, 1959.
With their own military forces in substantial control of the country,
Castro and his lieutenants dissolved Congress, disbanded political parties, 
exiled several hundred thousand Cubans, thoroughly reorganized governing bodies, 
and collectivized large parts of the economy. By 1962 power was sharply cent­
ralized in an essentially totalitarian party, the Integrated Revolutionary 
Organizations. In substance, Castro's victory in a civil war replaced a dis­




























































































been n.odified frequently, Cuba's political institutions have been immune to 
irregular seizures of power ever since this elite transformation.
Nigeria 1960-1980: Initially there were indications that the state of the
multi-ethnic national elite vliich took over from British rulers at independence 
in 1960 was consensually unified. On the basis of long British tutelage in 
representative politics, elite factions cooperated with considerable smoothness 
to operate a complex federal system and to transform Nigeria into a republic 
during the first half-dozen years of independence. However, ethnic, regional 
and religious conflicts at the popular level eventually tore the national elite 
apart, and the country's stable political institutions became unstable.
The most acute problem was the pervasive success of the Ibo peoples, 
who were natives of the Eastern region, as a modernizing and competitive force 
throughout the federation. The feudalistic Arab culture of the North and the 
distinctly stratified culture of the West produced widespread anti-Ibo feeling. 
In January 1966 Ibo military officers rose up and killed several Northern 
political leaders, including the prime minister. Although apparently not a 
participant in this mutiny, the military commander, an Ibo, judged it necessary 
or expedient to assume dictatorial power. Six months later a military coup 
by Northern officers overthrew and killed the Ibo dictator amid widespread 
massacres of Ibo people living in the North. After attempts by the Northerners 
to limit Ibo influence, the Ibo-dominated Eastern region seceded as Biafra.
The war of secession wdrich followed involved much carnage and starvation, and 
in 1970 Biafra surrendered and was re-incorporated into the federation.
Since sometime before the initial coup d'etat in 1966 the state of the 
national elite has been disunified. The faction in control of the military 
regime which won the civil war was overthrown by another military faction in 
1975, and the leader of the latter group was assassinated the following year. 
Between 1976-1978, however, the military allowed and encouraged protracted 
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Uruguay: A series of rural uprisings, a civil war, a succession of military
regimes, and finally a revolt that entailed much bloodshed indicated that the 
state of the national elite was disunified and that the institutional condition 
was one of instability until at least 1904. At that time there were two broad elite 
factions centering on two political parties. The Colorados were based largely on 
city support and tended to be anti-clerical and liberal-progressive in ideology.
The Blanccs tended to dominate most rural areas and were highly traditional in 
outlook. The Colorados managed to dominate government from 1904 until a Blanco 
victory in 1958, during which time they established an elaborate welfare state 
which satisfied urban voters and was at least tolerable to rural landowning 
interests, even though ranching and agriculture were carrying the weight of 
the rising living standards in urban areas. Blanco leaders participated in the 
system mainly through various deals which offered them a limited share of 
representation and political power. For the most part they made little attempt 
to compete seriously in national elections. But the high standard of living in 
Montevideo prevented the rise of forces more leftist than the Colorados, w’hile 
the Blancos remained free to address hierarchical and, during the 1930s, even 




























































































This peculiar arrangement is probably best classified as comprising an 
imperfectly unified elite from 1904 until the military take-over in 1973.
Especially during the earlier part of the period, the political system was 
doubtfully democratic, and institutions were only precariously stable (as demon­
strated by the irregular actions of incumbent presidents at the outset in 1903-1904 
and again in 1942). By and large, however, the entrenched elite factions were 
prepared to observe institutional procedures, as indicated by the importance of 
institutional reforms which compelled presidents to share executive power with 
a bipartisan elected executive council between 1919-1933 and which abolished the 
presidency in favor of such a council between 1951-1966 (cf. Weinstein, 1975).
Eventually, however, the shameless patronage system on which the imperfect 
unity of the elites depended destroyed managerial competence and work discipline 
in the country's numerous state enterprises. Together with low export prices 
for beef and other rural produce from the mid-1950s onwards, this meant that the 
economy could no longer sustain the welfare state benefits and high living 
standards previously shared by a large urban middle class and a rancher aristoc­
racy. By the mid-1960s, an intransigent and radical urban guerrilla movement, 
the Tupumaros, was in existence, a trade union federation had formed, and a 
bloc of parties well to the left of the Colorados was emerging. A series of 
make-shift economic measures and political arrangements during the late 1960s 
proved ineffective, and in 1972 the new Colorado president, Bordaberry, engineered 
a general mobilization of troops to crush the Tupumaros. Although it allowed 
Bordaberry to remain in office, the army assumed responsibility for government 
during 1973, dsssolved Congress, disbanded the trade union federation, outlawed 
the new left-wing parties, and arrested or exiled numerous political leaders.
In 1976 the military deposed Bordaberry, established a junta and designated the 
next president. But by 1973, w’hen the military terminated the long dominance 
of the" two traditional parties and repressed left-wing elite factions, the state 




























































































time institutions which had been precariously stable since early in this 
century became clearly unstable.
Belgium: A case can be made that, consonant with the absence of irregular
seizures of power in Belgium's modern history, the national elite has been con- 
sensually unified from 1830 when the country became independent of foreign rule 
(Zolberg, 1978). However, the frequency of serious political crises and the 
long electoral dominance of essentially conservative elite factions and parties, 
the Liberals and the Catholics (now the Social Christians), over a clearly leftist 
faction, the Socialists, are probably best interpreted as indicating that the 
Belgian national elite was only imperfectly unified down to about 1960. From 
their emergence in the 1880s, the Socialists were unable to form a government 
in their own right and could only hope to achieve some measure of power in 
coalition with either the Liberals or the Catholics. With their egalitarian 
programs and goals thus permanently stymied, Socialist elites were inclined to 
organize or encourage bitter strikes, demonstrations and riots to protest 
government policies. Although political institutions were stable, their 
operation was frequently enveloped in such harsh ideological clashes (Lorin,
1965).
During the 1950s the ethnic consciousness of the Flemish and Walloon 
regions increased as a result of the newly apparent numerical superiority, more 
rapid modernization, and greater prosperity of the Flemish. In the winter of 
1960-61 widespread strikes and protests broke out against the burden allegedly 
placed on the working class by government austerity measures in the wake of 
Belgium’s loss of its Congo colony. Class-based and left-wing in focus, these 
disruptions conformed initially to the pattern of frustrated outbursts with 
which leftist elite factions had long been associated. On this occasion, 
however, the character of social protest changed in mid-stream and became mainly 
a manifestation of Wallonian ethnic defensiveness against increasing Flemish 




























































































French-speaking Walloons had previously enjoyed. Within a few years all 
three traditional parties split into distinct ethnic organizations and a 
number of new regional parties and movements emerged.
By blanketing the traditional class-oriented radicalism of left-wing 
elite factions, these events appear to have facilitated a transformation of 
the national elite from the imperfectly unified to the consensually unified 
state. Henceforth factional and party divisions strongly tended to run along 
ethnic rather than class lines. However, the elite factions associated with the 
three traditional parties increasingly strove to contain the resurgence of 
regional divisions (Mughan, 1983). Gradually, these factions reached agreement 
that a restructuring of political institutions amounting to "federalization 
without federalism" was necessary (Zolberg, 1977). By itself, this elite 
consensus and unity could hardly be expected to assuage ethnic rivalries or to 
prevent the country’s eventual breakup. But the elite transformation which 
occurred after 1960 largely erased the threat to institutional stability which 
the old left-right antagonisms had comprised for many decades.
Austria 1955-1970: As indicated by the severity of conflicts between socialist
and non-socialist factions, the national elite was deeply disunified during the 
interwar period. However, the existence of a highly authoritarian regime 
after 1934, annexation by Germany in 1938, and Allied "liberation" and postwar 
occupation destroyed or discredited the more extremist elite factions. Never­
theless, at the end of postwar occupation in 1955 the factions associated with 
the two parties that had been electorally dominant before 1934, the Socialists 
and the People's Party (formerly the Social Democrats and the Christian 
Socialists), feared a resumption of the conflicts and disorders of the inter­
war years. They therefore agreed to continue the Great Coalition they had 
formed under occupation on the understanding that they would share all government 
offices proportionately and that the most central elite persons would settle 



























































































electorate. Although the People's Party von all parliamentary elections 
over the next ten years, this arrangement was continued until 1966 (Steiner,
1972, pp.409-416).
The pattern of Austrian politics between 1955-1966 is best interpreted 
as indicating an imperfectly unified national elite in the sense that moderate 
and somewhat conservative elite factions apparently perceived that there were 
other, dissident elite groups capable of making trouble. To keep these other 
groups at bay, the two main factions cooperated closely with each other. But 
in 1966 the People's Party undertook to govern alone and the Socialists assumed 
the function of an opposition. As became fully apparent in 1970 when the 
ocialists formed a minority government and in 1971 when they won a parliamentary 
majority, a smooth transition to competitive two-party electoral politics took 
place without arousing the old elite antagonisms (Steiner, 1972, pp.417-419). The 
evident solidity of this political pattern in the years after 1966 indicates 
that a further change in the state of the national elite —  to consensually 
unified —  occurred at about that time. Given these postwar states of the 
national elite, Austrian political institutions have been stable throughout 
the period.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have summarized a substantial amount of evidence to the effect that 
four states of national elites were associated with four institutional conditions 
in a large number of countries between 1950-1982. The institutional conditions 
which prevailed in these countries are readily verifiable matters of public 
record and we think that our classification of them is relatively straight-forward. 
However, our judgements as to the states of elites are more open to argument, and 
we do not claim to have proved directly that the elite state(s) attributed to 
each country actually existed. This is because the data that would constitute 



























































































to have demonstrated empirically the determinate relationship between elites and 
institutions which we postulated at the outset. Rather, the states of elites 
and their influence on institutional conditions remain part of a construct which 
can only be verified indirectly.
Two aspects of the construct provide means for indirect verification.
The first is the contention that the four states of elites are ordinarily highly 
persistent. Transformations from one state to another occur only in extra­
ordinary circumstances which allow appropriate elite initiatives. The logical 
consequence of this contention is that the institutional conditions linked to 
the different elite states are also highly persistent. Until an elite trans­
formation occurs, each institutional condition ordinarily persists regardless 
of other changes in a country's socioeconomic, sociopolitical or international 
circumstances.
The recent political histories of most of the countries in our universe 
accord with this prediction. We observed no change in the institutional stability 
or instability of 73 of the 81 countries examined between 1950-1982, and we noted 
that in most of these countries no change had occurred for very long periods 
before 1950. Institutional conditions persisted despite the fact that the period 
before and after 1950 was one of immense economic, social and international change. 
There is thus a strong inference that institutional conditions are rooted in some 
relatively immutable dimension of politics. We think that this dimension is the 
self-perpetuating character of different elite states.
The other aspect of the construct which facilitates indirect verification 
is its specification of the circumstances in which various elite transformations 
can occur. If it is true that changes in institutional conditions are a con­
sequence of transformations in the states of national elites, then where a change 
in institutional stability or instability is observed one should find evidence of 
the special circumstances in which the relevant elite transformation must have 
taken place shortly before. Thus in the eight countries which displayed a change 





























































































events for evidence of the circumstances which would have permitted the 
appropriate elite transformation.
In Colombia and Venezuela, where clearly unstable institutions suddenly 
became stable at the end of the 1950s, we found circumstances that probably 
enabled the major elite factions to negotiate, voluntarily and deliberately, 
a settlement of their long-standing conflicts and to engage in markedly more 
cooperative and consensual relations after 1957-1958. In Nigeria and Uruguay, 
on the other hand, institutions that had previously been stable (albeit for 
only a short time in Nigeria and only somewhat precariously in Uruguay) were 
suddenly overthrown by the military in 1966 and 1973 respectively. In both 
countries we found circumstances (severe ethnic-regional cleavages in Nigeria, 
serious economic decline in Uruguay) that probably made the pre-existing states 
of elites no longer viable. Thus the coups that marked the onset of unstable 
institutions were the end points in a progressive fragmentation of Nigeria's 
consensually unified elite and Uruguay's imperfectly unified elite.
The sudden shift in Cuban institutions from endemic instability to 
stability after 1959-1960 had its roots in essentially revolutionary circum­
stances which enabled a radical elite faction to triumph over other factions 
and to create an ideologically unified national elite. In France, the noticeably 
greater institutional stability of the 1960s and 1970s can be traced to circum­
stances surrounding the Algerian debacle which allowed the imperfect unification 
of a previously disunified elite. De Gaulle was able to consolidate and repeated 
ly demonstrate a conservative electoral majority. This rendered left-wing 
factions more or less impotent so long as they retained their radicalism, and it 
permitted a coming together of previously fragmented center and right-wing 
factions in a durable political coalition. By 1981, however, the party con­
figuration and radicalism of the left had changed enough so that a Socialist- 
dominated government was no longer seen as deeply threatening to a majority of 
French voters. Thus the 1981 elections probably mark a further transformation 



























































































the immunity of Belgian and Austrian institutions to instability or even to 
harsh left-right clashes after about 1960 and 1966, respectively, began in 
circumstances which were propitious for full consensual unifications of 
imperfectly unified elites. In Belgium the rise of ethnic-regional conscious­
ness eclipsed socially radical positions, while in Austria a decade of careful 
political management by moderate factions showed that radical groupings no 
longer comprised a serious force that had to be defended against.
In all eight cases, then, changes in institutional conditions appear to 
have originated in sets of circumstances which approximate those specified by 
the elite construct as propitious for the particular elite transformations which 
would bring such changes about. When added to the elite transformations and 
subsequent changes in institutional conditions during earlier historical periods 
to which we have alluded (i.e., England, Sweden, Mexico, Denmark, Norway, Russia, 
Italy, Germany), these eight cases help to comprise a respectable body of evidence 
for the idea that elite transformations are a prerequisite for changes in 
institutional stability and instability. In sum, the political record of the 
last 32 years is consistent with two aspects of the elite construct: (1) institu­
tional conditions persist failing transformations in the states of national 
elites; and (2) circumstances propitious for particular kinds of elite trans­
formations precede observed changes in institutional conditions.
The theory we advance has several implications which deserve mention.
First, it raises questions about the causal importance of many non-elite or 
international variables that are commonly employed to explain institutional 
stability and instability. These questions are apparent in the lack of corres­
pondence between the classification of countries generated by the elite construct 
and the classifications derived from non-elite or international explanatory 
variables. Each of the four categories in our classification contains countries 
which are situated at different levels of socioeconomic development and in 
different parts of the world-system (cf. Wallerstein, 1974). Each category 




























































































systems, political party systems, ethnic and other sub-national cleavage 
patterns, political cultures, political histories, and so on. The implication 
is that none of these often-used explanatory variables is systematically related 
to variations in institutional stability and instability.
Yet it would be a mistake to interpret our theory as holding that non­
elite and international variables have no impact on institutional conditions.
On the contrary, they impinge on institutional conditions in at least the 
following ways:
1. Ethnic, religious, linguistic or other population divisions that have a 
clear geographic, regional basis may bring about elite transformations and 
changes in institutional conditions. This happened in Nigeria and Belgium, 
and it is a real possibility in India, Malaysia, the Philippines, South 
Africa, and Yugoslavia.
2. Among the effects of international warfare (including organized insurgencies 
that are effectively supported by foreign powers) may be elite transformations 
and changed institutional conditions. There was no clear example of this
in our 1950-1982 universe, but the outcomes of wars and insurgencies were 
clearly basic to the creation of new elite states and institutional conditions 
in Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Albania, Yugoslavia and China earlier in 
this century.
3. A key feature of the circumstances which enable factions in a disunified 
elite to negotiate a settlement and transform themselves into a consensually 
unified elite is a low level of political mobilization among non-elite 
population segments. Elites are thereby relatively free to alter their 
partisan stances and to form new alliances. This describes the situation of 
English, Swedish and Mexican elites (and non-elites) at the times of their 
transformation, while specialists on Colombian, Venezuelan and Austrian 
politics whom we have cited believe that substantial elite autonomy greatly 





























































































4. Imperfectly unified elites originate only where the existence of a conserva­
tive electoral majority can be repeatedly demonstrated. This probably 
requires a population which is located at a relatively high level of 
affluence, bureaucratization and industrialization, in which a majority of 
voters has a stake in resisting radical egalitarian proposals (e.g. Norway, 
Denmark and Belgium from early in this century; Italy, Japan and France from 
early in the postwar period).
5. Spreading prosperity, bureaucratization and other aspects of continued 
socioeconomic development may well be necessary to the maintenance of an 
imperfectly unified elite and to its eventual transformation into a con- 
sensually unified elite. This is suggested by the Uruguayan elite's 
reversion to disunity under the strains of protracted economic decline, 
and by the abatement of left-wing radicalism, allowing a full unification 
of the elites, amid steadily more benign economic conditions in Austria and 
France.
Beyond these specific non-elite and international influences on the 
relationship between elites and institutions, it is almost always the case 
that elites need popular support for their actions. To obtain this support, 
they must make their appeals conform to the political orientations and interests 
of the population segments they seek to mobilize. This ordinarily limits v'hat 
elites can and cannot do. It is, moreover, a principal reason why states of 
national elites are so persistent. For elite transformations necessarily involve 
reorganizing the relations between elite factions and their non-elite supporters, 
a process that is always so difficult and dangerous for elites that they will 
avoid it in the absence of highly propitious circumstances and compelling 
incentives.
What are the main policy implications of this analysis? The promotion of 
stable political institutions that function along representative democratic 
lines has long been a goal of American and other western countries' foreign 



























































































still politically unstable countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. The 
means used have varied, but they have often involved aid programs intended to 
create mass conditions that are ostensibly more favorable to political stability 
and democracy (Packenham, 1973).^ They have also entailed entreaties and 
pressures to hold elections, cease the repression of political opponents, 
inculcate democratic beliefs among the masses, and generally to follow the 
institutional practices of liberal democracies.
It is not much of an exaggeration to say that western foreign policies 
have been completely unsuccessful in this respect. As we have seen, unstable 
or precariously stable political institutions have changed into reliably stable 
ones in only a handful of countries during the past 32 years. In none of these 
countries was this change the result of the western policies we have in mind, 
while the change that occurred in Cuba was hardly what the western countries themselves 
had in mind. Meanwhile, previously stable institutions became unstable in 
Nigeria and Uruguay, two countries that are typical of those towards which 
such western policies have been directed. In most non-western countries 
institutional stability has been conspicuously absent or it has been a temporary, 
fleeting phenomenon that has been followed by further periods of military rule 
or some other form of dictatorship.
Our theory identifies a key reason for this failure of western policy.
The United States and other western countries have concentrated on bringing 
about conditions which appear to have no systematic bearing on institutional 
stability, let alone on the practice of representative democratic politics.
The one condition that does seem to have such a bearing, the state of a national
^For example, in his "Crusade for Freedom" speech at Westminister in June 1982, 
President Reagan presaged a new American program to channel funds, possibly 
through the Democratic and Republican parties, in order to "foster the infra­
structure of democracy —  the system of a free press, unions, political parties, 
universities..." in countries that are less than democratic (Vital Speeches of/ 





























































































elite, has gone unnoticed. Thus a main implication of our theory is the 
desirability of reorienting western policy away from its concentration on 
non-elite conditions and towards a focus on elite structure and behavior.
But beyond this, the theory's policy implications are largely negative 
in the sense that the strongly self-perpetuating character of the states of 
national elites probably does not allow much manipulation by foreign countries.
At least, it is difficult to imagine how, through economic coercion or diplomatic 
maneuvers, a country like the United States could bring about the rare, 
historically contingent circumstances that are propitious for transforming 
the state of elite disunity into one of the two states that are compatible 
with institutional stability and representative democratic government. It is 
even more difficult to imagine how countries like the U.S. could then nudge 
all elite factions, including various radical groups, into reaching the settle­
ments and unwritten understandings that constitute such transformations. Not 
only would such efforts probably exacerbate existing elite disunity in the 
country in question, but they would risk creating serious political backlashes 
in the western countries themselves.
In the last analysis, the theory advanced here implies that there is 
little that western countries can do to promote institutional stability around 
the world. Instead, they ought to terminate many of the policies and measures 
they are currently pursuing in this regard. In so far as these policies and 
measures create unrealistic expectations about what is possible or likely in 
the politics of many countries, they are harmful. A related implication is 
that western countries ought to guard against mistaking temporary periods of 
institutional stability for the achievement of permanent stability. If one 
cannot find in a country's recent political record persuasive evidence that an 
elite transformation has occurred, then any current condition of stability is 
unlikely to survive the next serious political crisis. Western policies not 



























































































the regime in question is eventually overthrown and its successor seeks 
revenge for previous, misguided western involvements. Finally, if the theory 
is valid then the foreseeable political future of most of the world is likely 
to be one of continuing political instability and violence. Because there is 
little they can do about this,western countries will have to be much more 
explicitly concerned with defending their owm liberal democracies in a world 
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